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Abstract 
Knowing the norms of a domain is crucial, but there exist 
no repository of norms. We propose a method to extract 
them from texts: texts generally do not describe a norm, but 
rather how a state-of-affairs differs from it. Answers about 
the cause of the state-of-affairs described often reveal the 
implicit norm. We apply this idea to the domain of driving, 
and validate it by designing algorithms that identify, in a 
text, the “basic” norms to which it refers implicitly. 
1. Motivation  
Norms are important 
The word ‘norm’ refers to at least two slightly different 
ideas: one is a kind of idealization; in this sense, formal 
logic can be said to be the norm of human reasoning; the 
other is more related to the notion of common practice. It 
is this latter sense that we want to explore in this paper. As 
a matter of fact, knowing what will normally happen next 
is so important, that representing norms and reasoning on 
them have been identified as central issues rather early in 
the history of Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
Normal courses of events have been described in the 
1970’s by frames (Minsky 1974) and scripts (Schank & 
Abelson 1977). Capturing the ability to derive conclusions 
that normally follow from premises has been the major 
incentive for developing, in the 1980’s, non-monotonic 
logics e.g. (AI 1980). Norms are a topic often discussed in 
the framework of AI and Law, and in Multi-Agent interac-
tions (Boman 1999, Dignum et al. 2002). Reasoning on 
norms is often performed in this context by means of some 
kind of deontic logic (McNamara, Prakken 1999). Norms 
play also an important role in many other domains (normal 
evolution of social and biological systems, normal social 
behavior…). Less emphasized, but just as important is the 
role of norms in Natural Language (NL) understanding. 
Truth-based vs. Norm-based inferences in Natural 
Language 
Traditional NL semantics focuses on truth conditions. A 
text is said to entail the propositions that hold true when-
ever the conditions making the text true are fulfilled. This 
is a very weak notion of entailment. Consider for example: 
(S) I was driving on Main Street when the truck before me 
braked suddenly. 
The truth-based
 entailments of (S) contain propositions 
like: “there exists a time t such that I was driving at t, and 
there was a truck T before me at t, and T braked at t.” 
The norm-based entailments contain e.g.: “Both T and me 
were moving in the same direction with no other vehicle in 
between. The distance between us was less than 100 
meters.” 
Of course, the propositions of the latter list might be false 
while those of the former list are necessarily true if (S) is 
correct. Nonetheless: 
• every reader of (S) will take them at least provisionally as 
legitimate inferences, 
• the author of (S) knows that explicit indications should be 
provided somewhere in the text, in order to block these 
inferences, if they are incorrect. 
Norm-based inferences are thus as rightful and much richer 
than truth-based ones. According to the usual tripartition 
between syntax, semantics and pragmatics, they might be 
classified under pragmatics rather than under semantics, 
but no matter the label, they are extremely important. The 
problem is how to find the norms enabling to derive them. 
How to find the norms? 
Though from a theoretical standpoint, the tools mentioned 
in the introduction are still perfectible, they are developed 
well enough to start representing our knowledge about 
norms. But where is this knowledge? A similar problem 
arises in other areas of Knowledge Representation: there 
exist good frameworks (Semantic Networks, Description 
Logics, and so on), but filling a framework with actual data 
is a difficult task (e.g. the CYC project, Lenat & Guha 
1990). 
The data from which one can start in both cases is the huge 
amount of textual data now available under electronic 
form. But the problem is easier when the goal is to elicit 
so-called ontologies from such texts. Kind-of and part-of 
hierarchies, which are the critical ingredients of an ontol-
ogy, are more or less explicitly present in dictionaries, 
thesauri, glossaries, etc. Now, there exists no such reposi-
tory in the case of norms. 
Plan of the paper 
This paper attempts to develop a methodology to extract 
norms from texts concerning a specific domain. We cannot 
expect to do so from an automatic examination of the texts: 
as every reader knows them, the norms are never spelled 
out. However, it has often been noticed that many texts, 
mostly narratives, describe the discrepancies between what 
actually happened, and the corresponding normal sequence 
of events. This is of course not enough to infer the norm 
from the text. The idea consists in using causation as a 
leverage, in a way explained in section 2. 
Section 3 describes the method. Section 4 presents a reified 
first-order logic to cope with the problem of modalities. 
Section 5 is devoted to inference, and section 6 illustrates 
the whole process by a small example. 
2. Norms and Causes 
“Why did this happen?” 
Even if it does not seem so at first sight, the notions of 
cause and norm are tightly related, and we will take ad-
vantage of this relationship. 
Let us first notice that, strangely enough, there is very little 
consensus about the nature of cause. Some philosophers 
consider cause to be a “real” feature of the world (e.g. 
Kistler 1999); others consider it as a notion invented by 
humans to interpret phenomena, which, intrinsically, have 
nothing causal (see discussion e.g. in Pearl 1996). In spite 
of this controversy, causal reasoning is uncontroversially a 
very important issue for AI: systems for diagnosing or 
predicting are among the most useful applications of our 
discipline. In this respect, what is worth being considered 
as a cause must be something we can act upon. Gravitation 
may well be a cause of a glass being broken; having struck 
it is a more useful factor. 
Asking for the cause of an event potentially yields an end-
less list; now, in a given context, only few causes come to 
the mind. Mackie’s well -known example (1974) of an 
explosion happening after someone lit a cigarette is re-
vealing: if the event takes place at home, a sensible answer 
can be: “because the gas was leaking”; if it takes place in 
an oil refinery, the answer might be: “smoking in such 
places causes explosions”.  
This example shows that “why did this happen”-questions 
concerning abnormal events, yield answers that point to a 
violated norm. Hence the idea that, to elicit the norms of a 
given domain, we should analyze the answers to questions 
concerning the cause of abnormal events. 
(Garcia 1998) has written programs that extract causal 
relations from texts. Her goal is however different than 
ours: she attempts to collect all causal relationship present 
in large amounts of text, while we want to reach the norms 
governing a restricted domain by a close examination of 
some causal links. 
The domain we selected to check this hypothesis concerns 
car accidents, because: 
• we have already studied, for different reasons, a corpus 
of car crash reports written by drivers after an accident (tal 
1994); the reports are short texts, syntactically simple, and 
(unfortunately) we can get as many of them as we wish; 
• they describe abnormal events occurring in a domain that 
is non trivial, but limited well enough to make plausible an 
enumeration of all of its norms; 
• they are good representatives of texts requiring the reader 
to perform norm-based inferences in order to understand 
what happened. 
These texts have however a disadvantage: they are often 
biased. The author tends to describe the accident from the 
point of view that minimizes his/her responsibility. But this 
is not a real drawback: the norms that are important to 
collect in order to draw inferences, are those which the 
drivers have in mind, not the set of norms that govern the 
real events. Anyway no corpus can pretend to contain 
unbiased descriptions of events. 
Basic and Derived Anomalies 
The violation of the well-known norm: 
(N1) “under all circumstances, one must have control over 
one’s vehicle.”  
can explain almost every accident. However, in a text like: 
In order to avoid a child suddenly rushing on the street, I swerved 
and bumped into a parked vehicle. 
identifying the cause of the accident as a “loss of control” 
is misleading. As a matter of fact, the violation of (N1) is a 
consequence of a more imperative norm: 
(N2) “harming a person must be avoided.”  
Accordingly, “because the driver swerved to avoid the 
child” is a better explanation of the accident. As accidents 
are anomalies, we want to trace back their causes to an 
anomaly; obeying (N2) being a normal behavior, we fur-
ther identify the norm: 
(N3) “persons must not rush on causeways.”  
and prefer to ascribe the cause of the accident to the viola-
tion of (N3). 
Similarly, we sorted out, for each car-crash report, what 
seems to be the “basic” cause of the accident. This work is 
delicate. The aim is to extract what a normal reader under-
stands from the circumstances related, but, as we said, the 
description is often biased, and a normal reader knows that 
it can be so; therefore, understanding the report does not 
entail to take every statement of it for the pure truth.  
Sometimes, the writer’s argumentation is so obviously a 
purely rhetorical game, that the reader is implicitly driven 
to understand it as an admission of responsibility. A diffi-
cult part of the work is thus to determine up to which point 
the meaning intended by the writer deviates from the literal 
meaning of his/her text. 
Anyhow, the set of causes considered basic after all the 
texts have been manually processed, reveals a rather com-
prehensive subset of the norms of the domain. 
3. Method 
General idea 
In order to test within our limited domain of study, car-
crash reports, the ideas developed in section 2, we gathered 
a sample of these reports and went back, in each case as 
said above, to what we consider as the “basic” norm viola -
tion explaining the accident. The problem then consists in 
designing algorithms that copy this behavior. If the algo-
rithm correctly identifies the cause of the accident in new 
reports, this will mean that the set of norms collected is 
reasonably complete, and it will validate our approach. 
This is a hard problem, involving linguistic and knowledge 
representation issues, as well as reasoning mechanisms. 
Linguistic issues are so difficult that, by themselves, they 
would justify a full project. Some of the difficulties have 
already been identified in a previous work on the same 
corpus (tal 1994). Fortunately, we can skip all contextual 
elements (e.g. I was driving home), which are easily seen 
to be irrelevant for finding the cause of the accident. 
Nonetheless, the risk is high of being stuck in nearly in-
soluble linguistic problems, without ever knowing whether 
their resolution matters for our purpose. Therefore, instead 
of going “forward” from the text to the norms, we started 
“backwards”: we assume the earlier stages to be solved, 
and concentrate on the last ones. This method secures that 
we focus only on issues that are necessary. 
Layers 
Our problem is to handle the transition from hundreds of 
relevant propositions found in the texts, towards an ex-
pected small number of norms. It would be foolish to at-
tempt to solve it in one single step. We therefore split it in 
layers: the most external one is the mere result of a parser, 
filtered from the irrelevant elements of the reports. The 
most internal one, layer 1 also called the “kernel”, consists 
in a very small number of predicates listed in Appendix 1. 
Hypothesis H1: All the “basic” anomalies can be explained 
by means of the predicates of the kernel. 
Furthermore, we assume that the representation of the text 
at layer n can be obtained from its representation at layers 
n’>n by means of a limited number of inference rules, each 
one factoring out the common features that govern a spe-
cific concern. The whole process is thus a stepwise con-
vergence from a vast variety of situations towards a 
smaller number of cases. 
As a rule, layer n is conceived in such a way that its data 
comes either directly from the text, or indirectly from 
layers n’ • n. This constraint is not sufficient to specify 
totally the layers; nor does it yield a total order on them. 
But determining exactly the boundary between layers is 
not critical: what is important is that each layer handles a 
limited number of rules, for the reasoning to remain 
tractable, and to avoid cycles between layers. 
Currently, we specified three layers: layer 1 (the kernel) 
contains predicates which do not need to be further ana-
lyzed; layer 2 uses data concerning priorities, visibility, 
lanes, obstacles, and miscellaneous causes of loss of con-
trol; layer 3 (under construction) deals, among other con-
cerns, with reasoning about positions of vehicles. 
4. Time and modalities 
An important issue, which remains to be dealt with, is the 
connection between the grammatical tenses, found in the 
text, and the phenomenal time (De Glas & Desclés 1996). 
But in order to find a satisfactory solution, we must know 
precisely what time needs be represented. 
Several times play a role in our problem: 
(i) the (linear) time of the reader: propositions in 
the text are ordered, but this order does not 
necessarily reflect the sequence of the events 
accounted for; 
(ii) the (linear) time of the events; 
(iii) the (branching) time considered by the 
agents: each agent indeed knows that only 
one future will come true, but his/her actions 
are explainable only by considering the 
possibility of several of them, among which 
(s)he tries to eliminate the undesirable ones. 
Hypothesis H2: Our goal requires only the explicit repre-
sentation of (ii). 
H2 is a rather strong hypothesis, since our texts abound 
with lexical items like “avoid”, “ prepare”, “ expect” (and 
their negation) that evoke unrealized futures. However, the 
author generally makes use of them for argumentation 
purposes, which provide no significant help in finding the 
causes of the accident. Notice that the hypothesis does not 
consider the unrealized futures as of no import, but only 
that these futures do not need explicit representation. 
About anomalies 
Hypothesis H3: Basic anomalies can be represented under 
two formats; either an agent had to do some action a, had 
the ability to do a, and did not a; or an external factor that 
could not reasonably be foreseen explains the accident. 
The derived anomalies are those where an agent should 
have done an action a, but, due to a basic anomaly, was not 
in position to do it. 
According to H3, we need to reason on propositions of the 
form: MUST-DO a and ABLE-TO-DO a. They look like 
modals, and indeed they are; the former is clearly a kind of 
necessity, and the latter, a kind of possibility, but they do 
not obey the usual duality relationship. For one thing, an 
agent must not do ¬a every time (s)he is not able to do a. 
States and accessibility between states 
A modal account of the duties and abilities of agents can 
be given by means of a possible world semantics. The 
accessibility between states has clearly a temporal flavor. 
Yet, representing every time point of a sequence of events 
is unnecessary; in fact, the reports look like a sequence of 
pictures, rather than like a film, but this metaphor is not 
fully adequate, since the “pictures” may use predicates that 
are dynamic in nature. So, a state is not characterized by 
the propositions which are true at a given time point, but 
rather by those remaining true during a given interval. 
The problem is to determine the intervals. Our policy is to 
merge into a single state the action with its resulting state, 
whenever no change in modality occurs, i.e. what the agent 
MUST-DO and is ABLE-TO-DO remains the same once 
the action has been performed. On the contrary, the deci-
sion of an agent to do (or not to do) an action takes place 
in a state that strictly precedes the state where the action is 
performed. 
It ensues that anomalies are found in transitions, not in 
states. As the usual syntax of modal logics is not well 
adapted for this situation, we find more convenient to rep-
resent modalities as first-order predicates in a reified logic. 
The two formats of H3 are thus expressed by the formulas 
(p is the name of a predicate, Ag, the name of an agent): 
(F) MUST-DO(p,Ag,t) ∧ ABLE-TO-DO(p,Ag,t) ∧ 
¬HOLDS(p,Ag,t+1) → B-An (Basic-Anomaly) 
(F’) ABNORMAL-PERTURBATION(p,Ag,t) → B-An 
The price to pay is that predicates p are reified; as a 
consequence, for representing the negation of p, we have 
to introduce a constant not-p and to explicit obvious facts: 
(∀p,Ag,t) HOLDS(p,Ag,t) ↔ ¬HOLDS(not-p,Ag,t) which 
are given for free in usual logic. Practically, this constraint 
is not very cumbersome. It would be more tedious if we 
had to reason on conjunctions or disjunctions, e.g. 
HOLDS(p-and-q,Ag,t); we never met such needs. 
In order to represent scriptal unfoldings of events, we in-
troduce a third pseudo-modal predicate: NORMALLY(p, 
Ag, t). 
Pseudo-modal predicates refer implicitly to a set of acces-
sibility relations between states, with respect to which they 
are actually equivalent to kripkean necessities and possi-
bilities. For instance, NORMALLY refers to “normal”  
transitions. We do not develop further this aspect here. 
Whereas several accessible (future) states are meaningful 
in most cases, H2 says that only members of a totally or-
dered sequence need actually be present to reveal the basic 
anomalies. States are thus represented as integers, yielding 
a simplified version of the notion of chronicle (McDermott 
1982). 
5. Inference rules 
Introducing “normal” transitions naturally leads to using 
non-monotonic inference rules. We use a fragment of 
Reiter’s default rules (1980). This choice is motivated by 
reasons of clarity, but as defaults easily translate into auto-
epistemic logic (Konolige 1988, Denecker et al. 2003), we 
can take advantage of several existing deductive systems. 
We write A : B and A : B[C] as shorthands for respectively 
the normal default A:B/B and the semi-normal default 
A:(B∧C)/B. 
The basic default rule is: 
NORMALLY(p,Ag,t) : HOLDS(p,Ag,t+1), 
i.e. the transitions (t,t+1) in the actual unfolding of states 
are normal ones. Of course, since our texts report on acci-
dents, there must be at least one exception, i.e. one actual 
transition that is abnormal. 
In order to avoid an uncontrolled proliferation in the num-
ber of extensions, we appeal to defaults only when we 
have strong reasons to believe that a report could imply an 
exception to the rule we are expressing. In all other cases, 
even when exceptions are conceivable, we use material 
implications. Appendix 2 displays a sample of predicates 
and rules belonging to layer 2. 
Each layer contains a small number of facts: as we said, 
the most external level is the output of a parser, filtered out 
by all elements which obviously do not resort to causal 
reasoning; the inner level is progressively built by the 
rules; as their right side is about the same length as their 
left side, no explosion in the number of facts is to fear. 
Each layer n is first saturated by means of rules internal to 
n; then it starts the production of facts belonging to layers • 
n-1. The inference engine stops as soon as rules (F) or (F’) 
produces the atom B-An (basic-anomaly). 
6. Example 
Space limitations prevent us from showing but a very sim-
ple example. A significant minority of reports have this 
level of simplicity, and require only to reason at layers 1 
and 2. But a majority of them are far more complex. 
Our example is text B21 of our corpus, which reads: 
Nous nous sommes arrêtés pour laisser passer un véhicule de 
pompiers, la voiture qui nous suivait nous a alors heurtés. 
We stopped to let a vehicle of firemen through; the car following us 
then bumped on us. 
Assuming as said above (§3), that the linguistic issues are 
correctly handled, we start with three states 0, 1 and 2; the 
initial state 0 is the same for all texts; HOLDS(Stops, A, 1) 
characterizes state 1; the reason of this event, the firemen, 
is purely contextual: we thus omit it. HOLDS(Crash, A, B, 
2) and HOLDS(Is_follower, B, A, 2) characterize state 2. 
The reader probably notices that HOLDS gets a varying 
arity (3 or 4). This is clearly forbidden in first-order logic. 
We present it that way for clarity [actually HOLDS is 
ternary and, when needed, a binary function combines 
together the extra-arguments. The actual expression is 
thus: HOLDS(COMBINE (Is_follower, A), B, t)]. The 
same trick is used for the pseudo-modal predicates. 
Some predicates are declared static, and are endowed with 
forward default persistence, i.e. 
STATIC(p) ∧ HOLDS(p, Ag, t) : HOLDS(p, Ag, t+1) 
This assumption is usual (McDermott 1982). Here, and in 
several other texts, we need also a kind of abductive rea-
soning entailing backward persistence. Being static is not 
enough for being backward persistent, so we declare which 
predicates have this feature on a case-by-case basis. Here, 
we do have: 
HOLDS(Is_follower, Ag, Ag’, t)  : HOLDS(Is_follower, 
Ag, Ag’, t -1) 
This default yields: HOLDS(Is_follower, B, A, 1). Another 
rule tells: 
(∀ Ag,Ag’,t) HOLDS(Crash , Ag, Ag’, t) → ¬ HOLDS 
(Stops, Ag’, t)  
i.e. that whenever Ag’ bumps into Ag at time t, Ag’ did not 
stop at time t. We thus get: ¬ HOLDS (Stops, B, 2). 
Norm (N1) (see §2) translates into the rule: 
(∀ Ag,t) MUST-DO (Control, Ag, t) 
Agents are expected to comply with their duties, i.e.: 
(∀ p,Ag,t) MUST-DO(p, Ag, t) → NORMALLY(p, Ag, t) 
and the fact that normal events do normally happen is ren-
dered by the normal default: 
NORMALLY(p, Ag, t) : HOLDS (p, Ag, t+1) 
These rules, with t=0, give: HOLDS (Control, B, 1). 
We also have: 
HOLDS(Is_follower, Ag’, Ag, t) ∧ HOLDS(Stops, Ag, t) : 
MUST-DO (Stops, Ag’, t) [HOLDS(Control, Ag’, t)]  
which means that if Ag’ follows Ag, and Ag stops, then 
Ag’ must stop too, unless Ag’ is not under control.  
This rule provides: MUST-DO (Stops, B, 1). Finally, 
(∀ Ag,t) HOLDS(Control, Ag, t) → ABLE-TO-DO (Stops, 
Ag, t) 
i.e. for a vehicle, being under control implies being able to 
stop. This rule gives us ABLE-TO-DO (Stops, B, 1) which 
completes the premises of (F) (§4) with p = Stops, Ag = B, 
t = 1, and allows to derive B-An. 
This derivation stops the process. We are able to answer 
the question “Why did the accident happen?” and the 
answer, provided a simple NL generator is written, is: 
“because vehicle B did not stop at state 2” 
7. Perspectives and Conclusion 
Current state and short term perspective 
We have analyzed by hand a set of 73 reports. In each 
case, we have identified the basic anomaly and the 
sequence of states that is needed. We have identified the 
first three layers (layers 1 and 2 are illustrated in the 
Appendix). 
We have written 74 rules and defaults to handle layers 1 
and 2. Analyzing new texts will certainly show the need 
for new rules, or for generalizing existing ones, but we are 
fairly confident that the size of the whole enterprise re-
mains manageable: at worst, a few hundreds of rules 
should be necessary. 
The derivations are currently performed by hand. We in-
tend to complete shortly the other layers, and to validate 
the approach by testing them on fresh reports. 
Longer term perspective and conclusion 
There are a number of deduction engines working with 
various subsets of non-monotonic logics. We plan to 
switch as soon as possible from manual to automatic de-
ductions. As several taggers and parsers are available for 
French, we will test the possibility of taking the output of 
one of them as the input (external layer) of our system. 
But the important issue is not the success or failure of 
getting this work done automatically. If we have good 
reasons to believe that we have extracted a very small 
number of norms, and that a relatively small number of 
rules is enough to find which norms are violated, we will 
start to apply a similar methodology to other domains. 
Asking experts what they perceive to be causes of anoma-
lies, seems to be a good way to extract the norms in many 
domains. And representing the norms is of paramount 
importance to extend the inference capabilities beyond 
what is warranted by truth-conditional semantics. Moreo-
ver, being able to classify texts by the norms they are re-
ferring to, might open interesting tracks for indexing 
documents. 
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Appendix 1: the “kernel” 
Layer 1 contains 7 reified predicates. 5 of them have a pair 
<vehicle, state> as arguments: Stops, Starts, Runs_slowly, 
Runs_backwards, Control; the last one expresses that the 
driver controls the vehicle during the time interval 
corresponding to the given state. The last two predicates 
are: Changes_speed (first argument is ‘+’ or ‘ -’ depending 
on whether the driver speeds up or brakes, the two 
remaining arguments as before) and Disruptive_Factor 
(vehicle, name_of_factor, state). 
Appendix 2: sample of predicates and rules of layer 2 
Parked, Bend, Mistaken_Command, Slippery_Road are 
among the binary predicates of layer 2. Crash, Visible, 
Obstacle, Same_File, Is_follower are ternary predicates 
(two vehicles and one state, e.g. Ag is visible for Ag’ at 
state t). 
A few rules connecting these predicates to one another, or 
inferring predicates of the kernel are given in the text (§ 6). 
We display here other rules, of a different flavor, to give a 
more comprehensive idea: 
HOLDS(Bend, Ag, t) ∧ ¬HOLDS(Control, Ag, t+1) : 
MUST-DO (Runs_slowly, Ag, t) ∧ 
¬HOLDS(Runs_slowly, Ag,t+1) 
This default reflects an abduction: if Ag was in a bend at 
state t, and lost control at state t+1, it is likely that Ag had 
to slow down and did not do so. In order for (F) to apply, 
and to solve the case by deriving B-An, we must check that 
Ag was able to slow down, and this is the reason for the 
rule: 
(∀ Ag,t) HOLDS(Control, Ag, t) → ABLE-TO-DO 
(Runs_slowly, Ag,t) 
This next rule is hopefully self-understandable; as the pre-
vious ones, it connects layer 2 (Is_follower) with the 
kernel (Runs_slowly): 
HOLDS(Is_follower, Ag, Ag’, t) ∧ HOLDS(Runs_slowly, 
Ag’, t) → MUST-DO (Runs_slowly, Ag, t) 
Finally, we show a rule internal to layer 2: 
HOLDS(Same_File, Ag, Ag’, t) ∧ HOLDS(Crash, Ag, 
Ag’, t)  : HOLDS(Is_follower, Ag’, Ag, t -1) 
It captures the following abductive reasoning: if Ag’ 
bumps into Ag and both are in the same file, it is most 
likely that Ag’ was the follower  of Ag in that file. 
The whole set of predicates and rules of layers 1 and 2 can 
be found in (Nouioua, 2003). 
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